What is knowledge?
The most basic view is that it is True Justified Belief. For me to know some proposition for example that ‘the door is shut’, I have to believe it, be justified in believing it, and it must be true. My justification may well come from looking at the door and seeing it is shut. Thus if I have a justification to believe that the door is shut, then do believe the door is shut, and it is shut, then I have knowledge that the door is shut. This may seem to be incredibly intuitive, even to the point of being very correct. However I am not convinced by it – others are equally as dissatisfied.
What is wrong with True Justified Belief?
Many other people find fault with justification as a part of knowledge. We can often proclaim that we have knowledge of something, when in reality we are wrong to believe this. We may have a belief, and a justification, but it may not be true. For example I may have shut the door, thus have a justified belief that it is shut, but unbeknownst to me somebody has since shut the door. In this example I have a belief that is justified, but not true. So although I would claim to have knowledge that the door is shut, it would not be true, and thus not knowledge.
What is better than True Justified Belief?
One account that is argued to be better is the reliabilist account of knowledge. Which defines knowledge as Reliable True Belief. Rather than being justified, the belief is reliable. To continue with the example, perhaps my belief that the door is still shut after a time becomes unreliable if there are other people in a building.
This still runs into issues, I can have reliable belief that is not true. If my alarm goes off in the morning at the time I set it, then i have a reliable belief that it is presently the time that the alarm says. However it is possible that the alarm clock had reset over night, or perhaps the mains electricity stopped and the alarm went off late (as has happened to me). I would have a reliable belief that the time was what the alarm said it was – but this would not be true.
My fix.
I would take out the truth condition from knowledge. Rather I would regard knowledge of some proposition P, as a Justified belief that P is true. This means that we would be able to call some proposition that was untrue, knowledge. This is counter intuitive. This may even be wrong. However I think that it matches up with the way we use language. We often profess to “know” things that turn out to be untrue. We have mistaken beliefs that appear to be reliable or justified, but aren’t. We may even have such “knowledge” now. For example people really believed that the earth was flat. One may have said that it was common knowledge for people.
There is a condition of ‘No False Lemmas’ that some people apply instead of making the move I have. Rather than challenging the truth condition of knowledge, it adds the condition that the belief is not inferred from falsity. However this runs into the same problem – we do not know whether our belief is inferred from falsity or not. The awareness of falsehood or truth-hood falls outside of our belief in some proposition that we “know”. By that I mean that when we claim to “know” things, but that knowledge is untrue, we do not tend to have a way to access that truth. So it seems either unhelpful to define knowledge as having the belief inferred from no falsity because we can’t access this falsity – or it forces us to continue speaking of “knowledge” but being potentially wrong about it still.
So I think we should consider knowledge as something fallible. To do this, we must take away the truth condition.
If anyone has had the patience to get through this, I appreciate comments and challenges. Thank you.